Written by Kanu Priya & Akshat Kumar, students at National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi
The labour unrest that engulfed Noida in April 2026 was largely framed as a law-and-order problem. Yet it also posed a deeper question for India’s labour law regime. Barely six months after the implementation of the four labour codes, the protests raised concerns about whether legislative consolidation had addressed the structural conditions that continue to generate industrial conflict. It began with just a wage-related demonstration, but by 13thApril it escalated into a large-scale protest, leading to vandalism of public property and forceful entry into factories to destroy CCTV cameras and evidence. This led to the implementation of Section 163 of BNSS and arrest of more than 300 people as the aftermath in the affected areas. Now, this chain of events raises a very pragmatic question: do the four labour codes that were implemented last year (November 2025) address the structural issues that they were intended to address?
The reason why this escalated was the confluence of 35% minimum wage hike in Haryana in April 2026 (which was already 19000 compared to only 10000 in Noida), a huge disparity in wages in nearby states, delayed payments, poor working conditions, low compliance and flaws in the recent labour codes.
After the violent protest, the authorities took a few steps to prevent further escalation. They constituted a high-level panel composed of people from labour and industry, chaired by the Industrial Development Commissioner. Revised interim minimum wages (of around 20–21%) with retrospective effect from 1st April 2026 were announced. Proceedings against over 200 contractors were initiated for withholding wages, overtime, and other statutory benefits. Despite increased police presence and the imposition of Section 163 of the BNSS, fresh protests continued to surface across different parts of the NCR.
These protests should not be seen in isolation because they are a reflection of structural and statutory deficiencies.
The Legal Architecture: Four Labour Codes
Broadly speaking, many experts claim that the Noida incident has been separated into two distinct categories. The first category is linked to the deep nature of the rules for working, because these control how money for work is managed and how the working groups speak for themselves. The second category is associated with troubles with making people follow the law, which started even before the current rules existed. Differentiating these two categories remains vital in determining the effectiveness of the reforms in tackling the root causes of industrial unrest.
The labour law regime in India was consolidated on 21st November 2025 with the enactment of four key Acts: Code on Wages (2019), Industrial Relations Code (2020), Code on Social Security (2020) and Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code (2020). The codes have superseded 29 previously existing labour laws and have come into effect via notified rules.
The rationale behind introducing these laws was to simplify compliance, formalise and ease of doing business. The recent Noida protests, however, served as a litmus test to see whether this consolidation has been able to provide effective protection or not.
Wage Regulation and the Limits of the Code on Wages
The Code on Wages introduces a statutory provision, “floor wage” as per Section 9 (read with Rule 11 of the Code), and a uniform definition of wages across sectors. By implementing this, the central government shall make a baseline of minimum wages which can vary for different geographical areas, and state governments must ensure the minimum wages are not lower than what is prescribed in Section 9 (2) of the same act.
Laws and disputes related to labour and trade unions are listed under Entry 22 and Entry 24 of the Concurrent List, which empowers the state to make laws on the fixation of wages. This can lead to “race to the bottom” by the state, where states intentionally slash taxes, weaken labour laws and wages in order to attract foreign companies. To prevent this, the code for wages becomes essential, but despite the implementation of this code for months now, no floor wage has been notified by the central government yet.
The Act still does not guarantee a “living wage” mentioned under Article 43 in the Indian Constitution. Workers demanded monthly wages significantly higher than statutory minimums, pointing to inflation and cost of living pressures.
Code of Industrial Relations and the Right to Protest.
The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 substituted the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Trade Unions Act, 1926, and made the procedures of strike much more rigid. The workers are now required to provide 14 days notice before strike and it cannot commence during the adjudication process. While these provisions are intended to promote industrial stability, they also increase the procedural barriers associated with collective action, particularly for workers operating outside formal union structures.
This is reflected in Noida protests as well. No notice of strike was provided beforehand by the workmen, no conciliation officers were met and no provisions of the Code were invoked. The workers just organized themselves and went around the statutory machine. This raises an issue that the legislature did not adequately address: Can informal workers’ protests be constitutionally protected if the formal grievance processes are not available to them?
As decided by the Supreme Court in All India Bank Employees Association v National Industrial Tribunal (1962), Article 19(1)(c) does not necessarily safeguard all weapons that a union might want to use. The official stance is that the recourse has to be made by statutory means. However if statutory grievance systems are not available or not effective, strict grievance procedures may lack the legitimacy of workers who do not work within the systems.
Contract Labour and Enforcement Failures
What the Noida violence revealed was perhaps worse than the violence itself: mass non-conformity along the industrial belt. The government started prosecuting more than 200 contractors due to non-payment of wages, overtime, and statutory benefits. More than that number indicates an ingrained culture of non-compliance that is concealed by the multiple manpower agency layers, rather than some isolated violations.
These arrangements were regulated by the OSHWC Code, which superseded the Factories Act, 1948, and the Contract Labour Act, 1970, from November 2025. The principal employers have a statutory responsibility of contractor compliance. However, an alarming aspect of the new regime is how it handles the spread over. The Factories Act limited the number of daily working hours to nine, spread out to ten and a half hours. The OSHWC Code permits greater flexibility. Practically, employees officially working eight-hour shifts are held on-site and forced to work twelve or even extra hours are poorly paid. The flexibility that is being provided has been used as a tool of exploitation.
In People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that failure to pay minimum wages is contrary to the provisions of Article 23 which forbids forced labour. Twelve hours a day, wages of Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 11,000 a month, overtime, no weekly rest: they are not merely violations of the laws. In the Court’s very own language, this constitutes forced labour. The broader concern is whether the flexibility introduced under the OSHWC Code, when combined with weak enforcement, may permit working conditions that fall short of the constitutional commitment to dignity and fair labour standards.
The Informal Workforce and Social Security
The Code on Social Security, 2020 is an ambitious endeavour to include gig workers, platform workers and the unorganised sector under a single social protection system. The implementation is still highly uneven.
The majority of Noida protesters were contractual or informal workers, who were structurally marginalised by the employer-employee relations, which social security entitlements assume. In several cases, contractors failed to deposit EPF and ESI contributions with the appropriate authorities despite having deducted them from workers’ wages.
The failure to deposit statutory contributions undermined the very protections that the social-security framework was designed to guarantee.
There are no dependable statistics regarding the real coverage of the new Code: the data on enrollment, the status of the gig workers accounts in industrial areas, the rate of the compliance of the contractors with the requirements in the industrial zones, all this information is not presented in any publicly indexed database. This lack of publicly accessible compliance data raises important questions about transparency and accountability within the implementation framework of the Code. The absence of operational healthcare and income security, Rs. 11,000 a month, at the time when LPG prices are increasing, lacks economic cushions. To them it’s not just a wage dispute but an existential crisis.
Beyond Legislative Reform: Structural Drivers of Labour Unrest
The labour codes reorganise the legal framework governing employment, but they do not resolve the institutional and economic conditions that shape labour relations. The Noida protests were influenced by structural pressures which cannot be resolved through legislative consolidation alone.
The next immediate trigger was the wage disparity between the state of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. The April 2026 revision of Haryana increased its minimum wage. As labour falls in the Concurrent List, the states are free to fix wages above the central floor, just as much as they are free to fix them at the floor. This “race to the bottom” dynamic is exactly what the Code on Wages was designed to prevent. The issue remains unresolved, as the Union government has yet to notify a floor wage despite the Code having been in force for several months.
There has also been a significant decline in real wages. The statutory minimum has not been kept up with inflation, and the living wage, enshrined in Article 43 of the Constitution as a directive principle, is as remote as it was during the period of the codes.
The ecosystem of enforcement is also weak. The reorganization of 29 laws into four codes has not been able to consolidate the inspection infrastructure. Labour inspection suffers from a shortage of resources, digital wage systems are implemented inconsistently, and the legal framework that holds principal employers responsible for contract labour is rarely enforced. As a result, a culture of non-compliance with little fear of consequences persists.
Above all, the Indian Labour Conference (ILC), the highest tripartite mediation body between the government, employers and union has not met in a few years. Beyond its consultative role, the ILC historically functioned as an institutional forum through which competing interests of labour, employers and the State could be negotiated before disputes escalated.
Implications and Conclusion
The principal lesson of the Noida unrest is that legislative consolidation cannot substitute effective enforcement. India’s labour-law framework has been simplified, but its success depends upon the institutional capacity necessary to implement it. Without stronger labour-inspection mechanisms, mandatory digital wage records subject to independent audits, and meaningful enforcement of principal-employer accountability, the objectives of the labour codes are unlikely to be realised in practice.
Section 9 of the Code on Wages on the floor wage only makes sense when the central government notifies it, of which it has not done so. In addition to this, the constitutional issue that was posed by Workmen v. Reptakos Brett & Co Ltd (1992) and Article 43 warrants consideration: the minimum wage should be re-tuned in the urban industrial centres where the current statutory minimum is a poverty-breeding formula, rather than a dignity-breeding one.
The Indian Labour Conference needs to be rejuvenated as a working body with a clear mandate and a regularity rather than a ceremonial body. Noida and others of this kind also require quick conciliation measures that are meant to be implemented in high intensity manufacturing areas prior to complaints in the arterial roads.
The Industrial Relations Code’s procedural structure is intriguing which warrants further analysis. The implementation of collective bargaining rights can be severely limited by the mandatory notice provisions and restrictions in the conciliation process, especially for unorganised workers. Improving the effectiveness of conciliation procedures would improve their accessibility, speed and credibility, which would help to ensure stability in the industry through good dispute resolution.
Without reliable state data on coverage, compliance and work of uninsured workers, it’s impossible to evaluate the Code on Social Security. Its continued absence reflects a failure of policy responsibility. What is not measured cannot be fixed, and what is not fixed will inevitably return to the streets.
The Noida unrest does not demonstrate that the labour codes have failed. It demonstrates that legislative consolidation alone cannot remedy labour precarity. Until wage regulation, labour inspection, social-security delivery and institutional dialogue function effectively in practice, industrial conflict will continue to expose the gap between statutory reform and workplace reality.
Caveat: The views, analyses, and information presented in this article are provided in good faith and for general informational purposes only. No representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding the accuracy, adequacy, validity, reliability, or completeness of the information. Readers should conduct their own research and seek professional guidance where appropriate. Neither the author nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any loss, liability, or consequence arising from reliance on this content.
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